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ABSTRACT
This paper studies implicitly colluding oligopolists facing fluctuating
demand. The credible threat of future punishments provides the discipline that
facilitates collusion. However, we find that the temptation to unilaterally
deviate from the collusive outcome is often greater when demand is high. To
moderate this temptation, the optimizing oligopoly reduces its profitability at
such times, resulting in lower prices. If the oligopolists' output is an input
to other sectors, their output may increase too. This explains the co-movements
of outputs which characterize business cycles. The behavior of the railroads in
the 1880' s, the automobile industry in the 1950's and the cyclical behavior of
cement prices and price-cost margins support our theory. (j.E.L. Classification
numbers: 020, 130, 610).

I. INTRODUCTION
This paper has two objectives. First it is an exploration of the
way in which oligopolies behave over the business cycle. Second, it
considers the possibility that this behaviour itself is a cause of
business cycles and of sticky prices. We examine implicitly colluding
oligopolies that attempt to sustain above competitive profits by the
threat of reverting to competitive behavior to punish firms that do not
cooperate. The basic point of the paper is that the oligopolists find
implicit collusion of this kind more difficult when their demand is high.
In other words when an industry faces a boom in its demand, chiseling
away from the collusive level of output becomes more profitable for each
individual firm and thus the oligopoly can only sustain a less collusive
outcome. This suggests that when demand for goods produced by
oligopolists is high, the economy produces an allocation which is
"closer" to the competitive allocation and thus nearer the production
possibility frontier. Insofar as the allocation in which the oligopoly
acts collusively is inside the production possibility frontier, a shift
in demand towards the oligopolistic sector can increase the output of all
goods. The fact that the outputs of all goods tend to move together is,
of course, the hallmark of business cycles. Thus we can interpret booms
in aggregate economic activity as being due to a shift in demand towards
the oligopolistic sectors and busts as shifts towards the competitive
sectors.
This analysis still leaves xinezplained the causes of the shifts in
sectoral demands. To make sense of actual business cycles one would have
to relate these shifts in demand to changes in the money supply and
interest rates which are highly correlated with cyclical fluctuations.
sectors grow, only to shrink when demand moves back towards the
competitive sector or when the punishment period is over.
Any theory whose foundation is that competitive behaviour is more
likely to occur in booms must confront the fact that the industrial
organization folklore is that price wars occur in recessions. This
folklore is articulated in Sherer (1980) for example. Our basis for
rejecting this folklore is not theoretical. We concede that it is
possible to construct models in which recessions induce price wars.^
Instead our rejection is based on facts. First, at a very general level,
it certainly appears that business cycles are related to sluggish
adjustment of prices (see Rotemberg (1982) for example). Prices rise too
little in booms and fall too little in recessions. If recessions tended
to produce massive price wars this would be an unlikely finding. More
specifically we analyze some other sources of data capable of shedding
light on the folklore. ¥hat we find is that both Scherer's evidence and
our own study of the cyclical properties of price cost margins supports
our theory. Our theory is also supported by an analysis of tne price
wars purported to have happened in the automobile industry (Bresnahan
(1981 )) and the railroad industry (Porter (l985a)). These wars have
occurred in periods of high demand. Finally, since Sherer singles out
the cement industry as having repeated break-ups of its cartel during
recessions, we study the cyclical properties of cement prices. To our
surprise, cement prices are strongly countercyclical even though cement,
as construction as a whole, has a procyclical level of output. These
empirical regularities are discussed in Section IV. We conclude with
Section V. . ' -
II. EQUILIBRIUM IN OLIGOPOLISTIC SUPERGAMES WITH DEMAND FLUCTUATIONS
We consider an oligopoly of N symmetric firms in an infinite-horizon setting
for both the case where the firms use price as the strategic variable and that in
which the strategic variable is output. It is well-known that in such models
even firms that cannot sign binding contracts, i.e. noncooperating firms in the
usual sense, are usually able to sustain outcomes in any period that strictly
dominate the outcome in the corresponding one-period game.
In order to achieve this the equilibrium strategies must involve a mechanism
that deters an individual firm from "cheating" (by expanding output or by shading
prices). One such mechanism and one that has been fruitfullly employed in
theoretical models^, is the use of punishments against the defecting firm in
periods following the defection. If such punishments are large enough to
outweigh the gain from a single period defection the collusive outcome is
sustainable.
In order for the equilibrium strategies to be sequentially rational^,
however, it must be the case that if a defection actually occurs the non-
defecting firms are willing to mete out the proposed punishment. One way to
ensure this is for firms that defect from the punishment to he punished in turn,
and so on. Rules which lead to optimal outcomes for the firms are provided by
Abreu(l982). A simpler way to ensure sequential rationality and the one usually
employed (see Green and Porter (1984), for example) is for punishments to involve
playing the equilibrium strategies from the one-period game for some fixed period
of time. In the sequel we restrict attention to strategies of this kind. As we
will see shortly, in addition to their simplicity and conformity with the
literature they are also optimal punishments when price is the strategic
variable.
The major departure of our model from those that have previously been
studied is that we allow for observable shifts in industry demand. We denote the
inverse demand function by P(Q , e) where Q is the industry output in period t
and e is the random variable denoting the observable demand shock (with
realization e. in period t). We assume that increases in e, result in higher
prices for any Q , , that z has domain [_e, e] and a distribution function F( e) and
that these are the same across periods (i.e. shocks are i.i.d.). We denote firm
i's output in period t by q. , so that
N
Qt= .1 lit-
1=1
The timing of events is as follows: At the beginning of the period all
firms learn the realization of e (more precisely z, becomes common knowledge).
Firms then simultaneously choose the level of their choice variable (price or
quantity) . These choices then determine the outcome for that period in a way
that depends on the choice variable: in the case of quantities the price clears
the market given Q ; in the case of prices the firm with the lowest price sells
as much as it wants at its quoted price, the firm with the second lowest price
then supplies as much of the remaining demand at its quoted price as it wants,
and so on. The strategic choices of all the firms then become common knowledge
and this one-period game is repeated.
The force of the observability of e. and the key to the difference between
the model and its predecessors is the following: The punishments that firms face
depend on the future realizations of z. The expected value of such punishments
therefore depends on the expected value of e. However the reward for cheating in
any period depends on the observable e+. We show that for a wide variety of
interesting cases the reward for cheating from the joint profit-maximizing level
is monotonically increasing in e . If c is large enough, the temptation to
cheat outweighs the punishment.'^ Being cognizant of this fact, an
implicitly colluding oligopoly settles on a profit below the fully collusive
level in periods of high demand so as to adequately reduce the temptation to
cheat. Such moderation of its behavior tends to lower prices below what they
would otherwise be, and may indeed cause them to be lower than for states with
lower demand. We illustrate this phenomenon for both prices as well as for
quantities as strategic variables,
(a) Price as the strategic variable
We begin with an analysis of the case in which marginal costs are equal to a
constant c. We demonstrate that the basic characteristics of our analysis are
not dependent on this assumption by means of an example below.
Let us point out at the outset that there always exists an equilibrium in
which all the firms set P=c in all periods. In this competitive case firms .
expect future profits to be zero whether they cooperate at time t or not.
Accordingly the game at time t is essentially a one-shot game in which the unique
equilibrium has all firms setting P=c. In what follows we concentrate instead on
the equilibria that are optimal for the firms in the industry.
¥e begin by examining joint profit-maximization and the benefits to
unilateral defections from it. Define II (Q,(e,),e,) to be the profit of an
individual firm in state e, if the firms each produce q which equals 1/N of the
joint profit-maximizing output, Q . If a firm deviates from this proposed
outcome it can earn approximately Nil by cutting price by an arbitrarily small
amount and supplying the entire market demand. Firm i would therefore deviate
from joint profit-maximizing output if
Nn''(Q^(£^),e^) - K^(e^) > if (Q^( e^). c^) i.e. if if(Q^( £^), e^) > K. ( e^)/(N-1 )
where K.(c, ) is the punishment inflicted on firm i in the future if it deviates
at time t.
The value of K.(c. ) depends on both the expected level of future profits if
there is no deviation at time t and on the nature of the punishment. Since we
want to concern ourselves with equilibrium strategies that are optimal for the
oligopoly and hence are interested in maintaining profits that are as large as
possible, we concentrate on punishments that are as large as possible; namely
those that have P=c for all t f:.llowing a defection. While infinite punishment
periods are extreme they are subgame perfect and need not actually be implemented
in equilibrium. If the industry members change over time, however, infinite
length punishments are not compelling. To moderate the effect of this assumption
in the calculation of specific examples, we use reduced levels of the discount
rate, 5.
Suppose that the level of firm profits that can be sustained in a period
with state e, is ir(e, , K(e,)) when the punishment is K(e ). Then using infinite
length punishments, the discounted future value of profits, and hence the
punishment, is
.-
^^'^^
^T^ Jl^it, K(e'))dF(s'). (1)
Since the right hand side of (l) is independent of e, , the punishment is
independent of the state and can be written merely as K.
Since p(Q^, e^ > P(Q^, ep for all c\. > e'^, n(Q^, e^) = (p(Q^, 4^"^^^t ^
(p(Q,, e")-c)Q, = n(Q,, e"). Therefore, for given K, there is some highest level
of demand shock, e^(K), for which (N-1 )lf°(Q^( e, ), e^)= K.
»
This means that for c. <_ e, , the monopoly outcome is sustainable so that
n^(e:,, K) = lf(Q™(e ), e ). By contrast, for e, _> e,, an individual
firm has an incentive to cheat unless
n^(c,,K)=^-lf(Q°(e;). c;). (2)
Of course K in turn depends on c. from Equation (l). In particular we have
Thus we have a mapping from the space of possible punishments into itself: a
given punishment implies a cutoff e, which in turn implies a new punishment from
(2). An equilibrium is a fixed point of this mapping.
It remains to provide sufficient conditions for the existence of such a
«
_
fixed point i.e., to show there exists an e ^ (_§, e) for which
t
lf(Q^4). e*) = K(e*)/(N-1) = if ( e*, K(s*)). Let
g(e;) = (N-l)lf(Q^(e;), e[) - U z'^)
'
(4)
where a is 6/(l-6). '
We need to show there exists an el (_e, e) such that g( e!) = 0.
Equations (2) and (3) imply that . .-
< r. m a(l-F(e;))K(e;)
K(e;) =
.j; Il"(Q?4). c[)^nH^^ (N-1)
a
°^'
^^^t^ = (1 - a/U-1) - aF(e;)/lN-l)) ' . ; ^ ^' - :
'
alf(Q^(_e),
_§)
Therefore, using (4) and (5) lim g(ej.) = (K-1 ) rr(Q^(_e), _e) (i-a/(N-l)
—
which is negative if H < (l+6)/((l-5) (Condition (i)).
At the other extreme, .
.
., ,
- ,
(5)
g (I) = (N-l)lf(Q^Ci), 1) - a /^ lf(Q^(e^),e^)dF(e^) >
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if n°'(Q^(e), e)/Jl if (Q^, e^)dF(e^) > a/(N-1 ) (Condition (ii)).
If Conditions (i) and (ii) hold, we have:
(a) g(e!.) is continuous, (b) g( e) > 0, and (c) lim g(e') < 0, which imply the
existence of an e! £ (_e, e) such that g( e! ) = as required.
Conditions (i) and (ii) have intuitively appealing interpretations.
Condition (i) ensures that the firms are not tempted to "cheat" from the joint
profit-maximizing output in all states. This requires that N not be "too" large
relative to the discount rate. The larger is the discount rate (so that the
future is more important and hence the effect of the punishment is greater) the
larger the number of firms the industry is able to support without a complete
breakdown in discipline. ; m
Condition (ii) ensures that the monopoly outcome is not the only solution in
every state. This follows when there is sufficient dispersion in the
distribution or profit maximizing outputs. Clearly if there is no dispersion,
then for large enough punishments there is never any incentive to cheat. The LHS
of condition (ii) is a measure of the dispersion of profits.
Although g( e' ) is continuous it is not necessarily monotone. As a result
there may be multiple values of e' for which g( e' ) = 0. Since we are concerned
with optimal schemes from the point of view of the firms in the industry, we
concentrate on the greatest such value. •'
-
There are several interestiag features of this equilibrium. First note that
* 4i mm ''^" *
for e > e we have n ( e , k) = ]I ( (Q ( e ), e ). When n ( e, , K) is so
t t t t t t
constrained, Q must be as high as possible without reducing firm profits below
the sustainable levelo By the dftfinitica of the ir(«), if Q, is lower
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and P is higher an individual fimi has an incentive to shade price slightly and
supply the industry demand. When e, goes up, Q, must go up if P(Q., e.) is to
remain constant since P is increasing in e. and decreasing in Q, . Moreover, if P
is held constant at a level above c, the profits from deviating increase.
Therefore P must fall. Beyond e , prices fall monotonically as e increases.
*
Below e, the oligopoly charges the monopoly price thus P tends to increase with
The model behaves as intuition would suggest with respect to changes in the
relevant parameters. Note firstly that the equilibrium value of K is decreasing
in N. Therefore, given (2) rr(Q,(e,), e.) is also decreasing in N. Thus the set
of states in which the monopoly outcome is sustainable is strictly decreasing in
N. In contrast to traditional models of oligopolistic interaction in which
oligopolies of all sizes are always unable to achieve perfect collusion, the
firms in this model are usually able to do so for a range of states of demand.
However, as in Stigler's model (1964) the degree of implicit collusion varies
inversely with N. "• •
As 6 decreases so that the future becomes less important, the equilibrium
value of K decreases and hence the sustainable level of profits and the set of
states in which monopoly profits are sustainable also shrinks.
As was mentioned above, punishments are never observed in equilibrium. Thus
the oligopoly doesn't fluctuate between periods of cooperation and noncooperation
as in the models of Green and Porter (1984) and Porter ( 1983b). This arises
because of the complete observability of e. . To provide an analagous model to
those just mentioned, we would have to further restrict the strategy space so
that the oligopoly can choose only between the joint monopoly price and the
12
competitive price. Such a restriction is intuitively appealing since the
resulting strategies are much simpler and less delicate. With this restriction
or. strategies the firms know that when demand is high the monopoly outcome cannot
be maintained. They therefore assume that the competitive outcome will emerge,
which is sufficient to fulfill their prophecy. In many states of the world the
oligopoly will earn lower profits than under the optimal scheme we have analyzed.
As a result, since punishments are lower, there will be fewer collusive states
than before. There will still be some cutoff, e,, that delineates the
cooperative and noncooperative regions. In contrast to the optimal model,
however, the graph of price as a function of state will exhibit a sharp decline
*
after e, with P = c thereafter.
The above models impose no restrictions on the demand function except that
it be downward sloping and that demand shocks move it outwards. However the
model does assume constant marginal costs. The case of increasing marginal cost
is more complex than that of constant marginal costs for three reasons: (l) A
firm that cheats by price-cutting does not always want to supply the industry
demand at the price it is charging. Specifically, it would never supply an
output at which its marginal cost exceeded the price. So whereas before cheating
paid off when (N-l)rf(e
,
K) > K now it pays off when if ( e. , K) > rf^( e. , KP) - K
where IT (e, , K, P) is the profit to the firm that defects when its opponents
charge P; (2) If a firm is to be deterred from cheating it must be the case that
n (e, , K, P) = rr(e, , K, P) - K i.e., the sustainable profit varies by state (in
contrast to the marginal cost case). (3) With increasing marginal cost cheating
can occur by raising as well as by lowering prices. If its opponents are
unwilling to supply all of demand at their quoted price a defecting firm is able
to sell some output at higher prices.
15
A few results can nonetheless be demonstrated. First suppose that deviatinc
firms do not meet all of demand. Instead the output which equates the monopoly
price to their marginal cost is less than demand. This occurs when N is large
and when marginal costs rise steeply. Then the deviating firms equate P(Q,
, c,
)
and c'(q ) where c' is the derivative of total costs with respect to output. By
the envelope theorem the change in the deviant's profit from an increase in e is
4^p(<'
^t^ it'^^'k' h^
. The change in profits from going along is -^ . It
^t et
is thus smaller, ensuring that deviations become more tempting as e rises.
However, in this case, if the oligopoly keeps its price constant in response to
the increase in e, the desire to deviate actually falls. This occurs because
when the price is constant the profits from deviating are constant. Instead,
since the oligopoly price exceeds marginal cost, an increase in e. accompanied by
a constant price raises the profits from going along.
When deviating firms meet all of demand the analysis is more difficult. For
this case we consider an example in which demand and marginal costs are linear:
P = a + e^ - bQ^ '"-'' ; / ^ , • : ,, . . - (6)
cC^i,) = cq.^- dq2^/2 '' .
'
(T)
Then monopoly output and price are:^ ,.'
.
Q^ = (a + e^ - c)/(2b + d/N) (s)
P°^ = [(a + e^)(bN + d) + bNc]/(2bN + d) (9)
m
If deviating firms could sell all they wanted at a price a shade below P
they would equate (c+dq) to P . This would lead to output equal to q... :
\^ = [(a + e^ - c)(b + d/N)]/[d(2b + d/N)] (10)
uThe actual output of the deviating firm, q , is the minimum of q and Q . So the
deviating firm meets demand as long as b is bigger than or equal to (N-l)d/N.
Marginal cost must not rise too rapidly and N must not be too big.
When the deviating firm meets demand its profits n are:
n^ = Nn'" + Nd(l-N)(q'')^/2 (11)
m m / V
The change in n from a change in e, is simply q . Therefore using (.8j the
change in the benefits from deviating is:
(12)d(n'^-n^) ^
(N-Oq^PbN - d(N-l)
de^ (2bN+d}
which is positive when demand is met. Cheating becomes more desirable as e.
rises. If the oligopoly is restricted to either collude or compete, high z.' 3
will generate price wars. Alternatively the oligopoly can pick prices P which
just deter potentially deviating firms. These prices equate FT, the profits from
going along, with n - K where K is the expected present value of IT minus the
profits obtained when all firms set price equal to marginal cost.
d s
Since q is linear in P , whether deviating firms meet demand or marginal
d S J31 s
cost, n is quadratic in P in both cases. IF is also quadratic in P . For a
given K one can then find P in the states that do not support monopoly by
solving two quadratic equations. The relevant root is the one with the highest
value of IF which is consistent with the deviating firms planning to meet demand
or marginal cost. The resulting P 's then allow one to find a new value for K.
One can thus iterate numerically on K starting with a large number. Since larger
values of K induce more cooperation the first K which is a solution to the
iterative procedure is the best equilibrium the oligopoly can enforce with
competitive punishments. Fig'are 1 graphs these equilibrium prices and compares
15
them to the monopoly prices as a function of states for a specific configuration
of parameters. In particular e^ is uniformly destributed over (0, 1 , . . . ,80 }.
As before the price rises monotonically to c, and then falls. The major
difference here is that eventually the price begins to rise again. The
explanation for this is straightforward. For high values of e. the equilibrium
value of P. is such that a deviating firm would increase its output only until P
equals its marginal cost; it is not willing to supply all that is demanded at its
lower price. An improvement in demand from this level accompanied by a constant
price actually reduces the incentive to cheat. Thus the oligopoly can afford to
increase its prices somewhat.
b) Quantities as strategic variabiles.
There are two differences between the case in which quantities are used as
strategic variables and the case in which prices are. First, when an individual
firm considers deviations from the behavior favored by the oligopoly, it assumes
that the other firms will keep their quantities constant. The residual demand
curve is therefore obtained by shifting the original demand curve to the left by
the amount of their combined output. Second, when firms are punishing each other
the outcome in punishment periods is the Coumot equilibrium.
The results we obtain with quantities as strategic variables are somewhat
weaker than those we obtained with prices. In particular it is now not true that
any increase in demand even with constant marginal costs leads to a bigger
incentive to deviate from the collusive level of output. However, we present
robust examples in which this is the case. We also show with an example that
increases in demand can, as "before, lead monotonically to "more competitive"
behavior.
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We show that increases in demand do not necessarily increase the incentive
to deviate by means of a counterexample. Suppose that demand is characterized by
constant elasticity and that a demand shock moves it horizontally from state e!
to state eV. In this setup the collusive price is the same in both states.
Therefore any firm that produces the collusive output sells more in state e!' than
in state t'. The residual demand curves the firm faces are therefore as
represented in Figure 2. A deviating firm chooses output to maximize profits
given these residual demand curves. Suppose that this maximum is achieved at
d
output D and price P for state e . For this to be a worthwhile deviation it
must be the case that the revenues from the extra sales due to cheating (cd) are
greater than the loss in revenues on the old sales from the decrease in price
from p(q , •) to P . But (except for a horizontal translation) the firm faces the
d
same residual demand curve in both states. Thus by selling at P
,
the extra
sales due to cheating are the same at e! (AB) than at e" (CD). Moreover the loss
in revenue on old sales is strictly smaller at e!. Therefore the firm has a
strictly greater incentive to deviate in state el than in state e".
The above counterexample exploits the assumption of the constant elasticity
of demand only to establish that the collusive price is the same in both states.
We have therefore also proved a related proposition: if the oligopoly keeps its
price constant when e. increases (thus supplying all the increased demand), the
incentive to cheat is reduced when demand shifts horizontally. Thus in the
examples we provide below, the oligopoly is able to increase the price as the
state improves.
Suppose that, instead, demand and costs are linear as in (6) and (V). Then
an increase in e, always leads to a biggc^r incentive to deviate from the
collusive output. This can be seen as fallows. Suppose that in this case the
17
oligopoly agrees that each firm should produce q,. Tne deviating firm therefore
maximizes:
n'^ = q.^ [a + c^ - c - b((N-l)q^ + q.^)] - dq^^/2 (13)
with respect to q . So its output is:
q^^ = [a + e^ - c - b(N-1 )q^]/(2b + d) (U)
The derivative of n at the optimum with respect to e, is q.
.
(1
-b(N-1 )dq
,
/d c. )
.
Therefore, using (8), the derivative of the benefit from deviating from the
collusive output in any one period is:
d(n^ - if) _ [b(N-l)f(a.c^-c)
'^^t (d+2bN)^(2b+ d)
which is always positive. Deviating becomes more tempting as e increases,
independently of -b and d, as long as both are finite. Therefore in the repeated
setting as long as the discount rate is not too large or N too small, individual
firms will deviate from the collusive outcome when demand is high. This leads to
price wars when the only options for the oligopoly are to either compete or
collude.
Alternatively the oligopoly can choose a level of output q that will just
deter firms from deviating when demand is high. These levels of output can be
obtained numerically in a manner analogous to the one used to obtain the P 's in
the previous subsection. These outputs equate IT, the profits from going along,
d _s
to (n - K) where K is the expected discounted difference between IT and the
profits from the Cournot equilibrium. By substituting (16) in (13) n becomes
quadratic in q . Since IT is also quadratic in q the q 's are obtained as
7 Si
solutions to quadratic equations for given K. ' The resulting q s allow us to
compute a new value of K. By iterating in a manner analagous to the one used to
derive Figure 1 we obtain the best equilibrium for the oligopoly. Figure 3 plots
the ratio of this equilibrium price to the monopoly price as a function of e,
.
While a variant of the argument made earlier guarantees that equilibrium price
rises as e. rises, it can be seen that beyond a certain e, the ratio of
equilibrium price to monopoly price falls monotonically.
19
III. BUSINESS CYCLES
So far we have considered only the behavior of an oligopoly in
isolation. For this behavior to form the foundation of business cycles
we need to model the rest of the economy. While the principle which
underlies these business cycles is probably quite general we illustrate
it with a simple example. We consider a "real" two sector general
equilibrium model in which the first sector is competitive while the
other is oligopolistic. There is also a competitive labor market. To
keep the model simple it is assumed that workers have a horizontal supply
of labor at a wage equal to P., the price of the competitive good. Since
the model is homogeneous of degree zero in prices, the wage itself can be
normalized to equal one. So the price of the good produced competitively
must also equal one. This good can be produced with various combinations
of labor and good 2. In particular the industry-wide production function
of good 1 is given by:
-
-
^'--..,.-4^
. (.3)
^1t ^^2M 2 ' 1t 2
where Q is the output of the competitive sector at t, Q^^. is the
It £L\X
amount of good two employed in the production of good 1 at t and L., is
the amount of labor used in the production of good 1 . Since the sector
is competitive the price of each factor and its marginal revenue product
are equated. Thus: '
.
L^t = (1 + y)/l - .
' (U)
^2t = '^- PQ21f ' ^^5)
On the other hand the demand for good 2 by consumers is given by: .
^2t = ^ - "^Q2ct ^ ^
" " ."
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where Q is the quantitj'- of good 2 purchased by consumers, n and m are
parameters and e is an i.i.d. random variable. Therefore total demand
for good 2 is given by:
P^^ = a - e^ - bQ^^
a = (np + mY)/(m + p) e^ = e^p/(m + p) (16)
b = mp/(m + p)
Note that equation (16) is identical to equation (6). To continue
the parallel with our sections on partial equilibrium we asavime that the
labor requirement to produce Q„. is:2t
\t - =«2t ^ ^^/2)q2^.
which implies that, as before, marginal cost is c + dQ . The model
would be unaffected if good 1 were also an input into good 2 since P is
always equal to the wage. If sector 2 behaved competitively marginal
c
cost would equal Pp. • Then output of good 2 would be Q while price
would be P :
^2t
" ^^ * H " °)/^^/2 + d)
^2t
^ ^^^ ^
^t^^
^ bc/2)/(b/2 + d)
An increase in e, raises both the competitive price and the
competitive quantity of good 2. By (15) less of good 2 will be used in
the production of good 1 thus leading to a fall in the output of good 1
.
So, a shift in tastes raises the output of one good and lowers that of
the other. The economy implicitly has, given people's desire for
leisure, a production possibility frontier.
Similarly, if sector 2 always behaves like a monopolist, output and
price are given equations (S) and (9) respectively. Therefore increases
in e, raise both Pp^ and Qp^ thus lowering Q... Once again shifts in
21
demand are unable to change the levels of both outputs in the same
direction. On the other hand if the industry behaves like the olicopoly
considered in the previous sections, an increase in c can easily lead to
a fall in the relative price of good 2. This occurs in three out of the
four scenarios considered in previous sections. It occurs when the
unsustainability of monopoly leads to competitive outcomes whether the
strategic variable is price or output as long as increases in e make
monopoly harder to sustain. It also always occurs when the strategic
variable is prices and the oligopoly plays an optimal supergame. The
decrease in P in turn leads firms in the first sector to demand more of
good 2 as an input and to increase their output. So, a shift in demand
towards the oligopolistic goods raises all outputs much as all outputs
move together during business cycles.
A number of comments deserve to be made about this model of business
cycles. First our assumption that the real wage in terms of good 1 is
constant does not play an important role. In equilibrium the reduction
in P„ raises real wages thus inducing workers to work more even if they
have an upwardly sloping supply schedule for labor. Whether this
increased supply of labor would be sufficient to meet the increased
demand for employees by sector 2 is unclear. If it wasn't the wage would
have to rise in terms of good 1 . More interestingly if the increased
supply of labor was large, P would have to rise thus increasing
employment also in sector 1 . This would lead to an expansion even if
good 2 was not an input into good 1 . This pattern of price movements is
consistent with the evidence on the correlation between product wages and
employment presented below. • , .•
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Second, the model can easily be made consistent with the procyclical
variation of profits. Even though sector 2 reduces the margin between
price and marginal cost as output expands, the difference between
revenues and total costs can increase as long as there are fixed costs.
Third, it is quite plausible that changes in financial variables
like the money stock and interest rates lead shifts in the composition of
demand. For instance increases in the money stock might be associated
with lower interest rates and a higher demand for durable goods. As
shown below, durable good industries appear to be more oligopolistic than
other industries. These shifts in demand form a large part of the
informal discussion surrounding the 1983 recoveiy in the US , for
example.
Random shifts in demand have already been showed to cause movements
in employment in the asymetric information model of Grossman, Hart and
Maskin (l983). However, contrary to the claims of Lilien (1982) such
random sectoral shifts do not appear to be correlated with agregate
fluctuations. Instead Abraham and Katz (1984) show that different
sectors only have distinct correlations with agregate output. Moreover
the sectors whose output is more correlated with agregate output appear
to have a higher rate of growth on average. This leads to the
statistical illusion that when output grows faster, as in a recovery,
there is more intersectoral variance in output growth then when output
growth is small, as iu a recession. Note th-^t Abraham and Katz's finding
that some sectors are more "cyclic" than others accords well with our
theory that shifts towards oligopolistic sectors are necessary to expand
aggregate output. This finding also appears to be somewhat at odds with
the literature on real, business cycles (Long and Plosser (l983) and King
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and Plosser (1984)). In this literature expansions are caused by-
favorable unobservable technological shocks. Aside from the fact that
there is no independent evidence for the importance of these shocks and
that they do not appear in the casual discussions of the people who are
directly affected by business cycles it is somewhat peculiar that these
favorable shocks always recur in the same "cyclic" industries.
^
Our model also sheds light on some slightly unfashionable concepts
of Keynesian economics. One of the most pervasive facts about increases
in the money supply is that they are not accompanied by equiproportional
increases in prices. Prices appear to be sticky (cf Rotemberg (l982)).
Suppose that, increases in e. are correlated with increases in the money
supply. Then increases in output are correlated with increases in the
money supply. As long as increases in output raise the demand for real
money balances, increases in the money supply will be correlated with
increases in real money balances. Prices do not rise equipropor-
tionately. A second concept we can usefully discuss in the context of
our model is that of a multiplier. This concept reflects the idea that
increases in demand lead output to rise which then leads to further
increases in demand. Here a shift in demand towards an oligopolistic
sector can raise that sector's output, lower its prices and thus raise
national income. In turn this increased national income can lead to
increases in the demand for other goods produced in oligopolistic markets
thus lowering their prices and raising their output as well. This
process can continue vmtil almost all oligopolistic markets have lower
prices.
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IV. SOME RELEVANT FACTS
a) The folklore
The theory presented in section II runs counter to the industrial
organization folklore. This folklore is best articulated in Scherer
(1980 p. 208) who says: "Yet it is precisely when business conditions
really turn sour that price cutting runs most rampant among oligopolists
with high fixed costs". Our attempt at finding the facts that support
this folklore has, however, been unsuccessful. Scherer cites three
industries whose experience is presented as supporting the folklore.
These are rayon, cement and steel. For rayon he cites a study by Markham
(1952) which shows mainly that the nominal price of rayon fell during the
Great Depression. Since broad price indices fell during this period this
is hardly proof of a price war. Rayon has since been replaced by other
plastics making it difficult to use postwar data to check whether any
real price cutting took place during postwar recessions. For steel
Scherer in fact admits the following: "... up to 1968 and except for some
episodes during the 1929-38 depression, it was more successful than
either cement or rayon in avoiding widespread price deterioration, even
when operating at leas than 63% capacity between 1958 and 1962 (p. 21 0).
This leaves cement. ¥e study the cyclical properties of real cement
prices below. To do this we collected data on the average price of
Portland cement from the Minerals Yearbook published by the Bureau of
Mines. ¥e then compare this price with the Producer Price Index and the
price index of construction materials published by the Bureau of Labor
statistics. Regressions of the yearly rate of growth of real cement
prices on the contemporaneous rate of growth of GEP are reported in Table
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1 . The coefficient of the rate of growth of GNP is always meaningfully-
negative. A 1^ increase in the rate of growth of GWP leads to a 0.5-1 .0^
fall in the price of cement. To test whether the coefficients are
significant the regression equations must be quasi-differenced since
their Durbin-Watson statistics are small. Indeed the coefficients are
all significantly different from zero at the five percent level. More
casually, the real price of cement rose in the recession year 1954 while
it fell in the boom year 1955« Similarly, it rose during the recession
year 1958 and fell in 1959.
These results show uniformly that the price of cement has a tendency
to move countercyclically as our theory predicts for an oligopoly. These
results are of course not conclusive. First, it might be argued that the
demand for cement might be only weakly related to GNP. Without a
structural model, which is well beyond the scope of this paper, this
question cannot be completely settled. The rate of growth of the output
of the cement industry has a correlation of .69 with the rate of growth
of GNP and of .77 with the rate of growth of construction activity
which is well knovm to be procyclical. However, these correlations are
not sufficient to prove that cement is "more procyclical" than the
typical sector included in GNP. Second our regressions do not include
all the variables one would ezpect to see in a reduced form. Thus the
effect of GNP might be prosying for an ezcluded variable like the
capacity of cement mines which Scherer would probably expect to exercise
a negative effect on the real price of cement. While this is indeed a
possibility it must be pointed out that capacity itself is an endogenous
variable which also responds to demsnd. It would thus be surprising if
enough capacity were built in a boom to more than offset the increase in
Table 1
THE CYCLICAL PROPERTIES OF CEMENT PRICES
Yearly Data from 1947 to 1981
Dependent
Variable
P^/PPI pC/ppj pC /pcon pC /pCon
Coefficient
Constant .025
(.010)
.025
(.012)
.038
(.007)
.037
(.008)
GNP -.438
(.236)
-.456
(.197)
-.875
(.161)
-.876
(.149)
P .464
(.173)
• 315
(.183)
r2 .10 .15 .48 .52
D.W 1.03 1.73 1.28 1.92
P is the price of cement, PPI is the producer price index and P is
the price index of construction materials. Standard errors are in
parenthesis.
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demand. If anything, the presence of costs of adjusting capacity would
make capacity relatively unresponsive to increases in GNP.
b) Actual price wars
There have been two recent studies showing that some industries
alternate beetween cooperative and noncooperative behavior. The first is
due to Bresnahan (1981). He studies the automobile industry in 1954,
1955 and 1956. He tries to evaluate the different interpretations of the
events of 1955- That year production of automobiles climbed by 45^ only
to fall 44^ the following year. Bresnahan formally models the automobile
industry as carrying out two sequential games each year. The first
involves the choice of models and the second the choice of prices. He
concludes that the competitive model of pricing fits the 1955 data taken
by themselves while the collusive model fits the 1954 and 1956 data.
Those two years exhibited at best sluggish GNP growth. QITP fell 1^ in
1954 while it rose 2% in 1956. Instead 1955 was a genuine boom with GNP
growing 7%. Insofar as cartels can only sustain either competitive or
collusive outcomes, this is what our theory predicts. Indeed, in our
model, the competitive outcomes will be observed only in booms.
Porter (l985'b) studies the railroad cartel which operated in the
1880's on the Chicago-New York route. He uses time series evidence (as
opposed to the cross section evidence of Bresnahan) to show that some
months were collusive while others were not. His theory which is
developed in Green and Porter (1984) is that the breakdowns from the
collusive output ought to occur in periods of unexpectedly low demand.
He finds no support for this theory from the residuals of his estimated
equations. Instead, we will argue his results support out theory. Table
2 presents the relevant facts. The first three columns are taken from
Porter's paper. The first
Table 2
RAILROADS IN THE 1880's
Rail Total Grain
Estimated Shipments Fraction Production Days Lakes
Nonadherence (Million Shipped (Billion Closed from
Bushels) by Rail Tons) 4/1 - 12/31
1880 0.00 4.73 22.1 2.70 35
1881 0.44 7.68 50.0 2.05 69
1882 0.21 2.39 13.8 2.69 35
1883 0.00 2.59 26.8 2.62 58
1884 0.40 5.90 34.0 2.98 58
1885 0.67 5.12 48.5 3.00 61
1886 0.06 2.21 17.4 2.83 50
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column shows an index of cartel nonadherence estimated by Porter. He
shows this index paralells quite closely the discussions in the Railway
Review and in tlie Chicago Tribune which are reported by Ulen (1978). The
second column reports rail shipments of wheat from Chicago to New
York. The third column shows the percentage of wheat shipped by rail
from Chicago relative to the wheat shipped by both lake and rail. The
last two columns are from the Chicago Board of Trade Annual Reports. The
fourth column presents the national production of grains estimated by the
Department of Agriculture. This total is constructed by adding the
productions of wheat, com, rye, oats and barley in tons. This
aggregation is not too difficult to justify since the density of
different grains is fairly similar. Finally the last column represents
the number of days beetween April 1 and December 31 that the Straits of
Mackinac remained closed to navigation. (They were always closed
beetween January 1 and March 31-) Such closures prevented lake shipments
of grain.
As can readily be seen from the table the three years in which the
most severe price wars occurred were 1881, 1884 and 1885. Those are also
the years in which rail shipments are the largest both in absolute terms
and relative to lake shipments. This certainly does not suggest that
these wars occurred in periods of depressed demand. However, shipments
may have been high only because the railroads were competing even though
demand was low. To analyze this possibility we report the values of two
natural determinants of demand. The first is the length of time during
which the lakes were closed. The longer these lakes remained closed the
larger was the demand for rail transport. This is the only demand
variable included in Porter's study. The lakes were closed the longest
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in 1881 and 1885. These are also the years in which the index of cartel
nonadmerence is highest. In 1883 and 1884 the lakes remained closed only
slightly less time than in 1885 and yet there were price wars only in
1884. The second natural determinant of demand, total grain production,
readily explains the anomalous behaviour of 1883. This was also the year
in which the total grain production was the second lowest in the entire
period and in particular, was ^2% lower than in 1884. This must have
depressed demand so much that, in spite of the lake closings, total
demand for rail transport was low enough to warrant cooperation. A
number of objections can be raised against this interpretation of
Porter's facts. First, Porter used weekly data instead of our annual
aggregates and it might be thought that weekly data provide a stronger
basis for accepting or rejecting our theory. In fact, however, the price
wars followed a seasonal time pattern. The first price war started
around January 1881 and lasted for the whole year. The second price war
started around January 1884 and ended at the end of 1885. We suspect
that around midwinter agents could form a fairly accurate prediction of
the opening of the lakes by studying the thickness of the ice. If they
expected the lakes to be closed for a long period they naturally expected
a price war to develop. Once the individual railroads predicted a war
for the future they were tempted to cut their prices immediatly for two
reasons. First, the per.elties for deviating were reduced since in the
future the outcome will be competitive in any event. Second, individuals
who had the capacity to store grain would postpone shipments if they knew
a price war was imminent thus lowering even the monopoly price. The
presence of such storage facilities would also seem to make
identification of the wsokly changes in demand difficult. On the other
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hand years with high grain production or with a short lake shipping
season will nonetheless be years of high demand.
The second objection to our analysis is that we use aggregate
production in the entire United States as our proxy for grain production
in the Chicago region. The reason for this is that it is very difficult
to define the Chicago region. It clearly includes more than the state
of Illinois but less than our proxy. In any event the movements in total
production figures represent mostly movements in the production of the
grain belt which includes Illinois,
c) Price-cost margins .
One natural test of our theory is whether there is substantial price
cutting by oligopolists when demand is high. Vrtiat is difficult about
carrying out this test is that prices must be compared to marginal costs
and that data on marginal costs at the firm or even at the industry level
is notoriously scarce. Traditionally researchers in Industrial
Organization have focused on price-cost margins which are given by sales
minus payroll and material costs divided by sales. This is a crude
approximation to the Lerner Index which has the advantage of being easy
to compute. Indeed Scherer cites a number of studies which analyzed the
cyclical variability of these margins in different industries. These
studies have led to somewhat mixed conclusions. However Scherer -:
concludes on p. 357: "The weight of the available statistical evidence
suggests that concentrated industries do exhibit somewhat different
pricing propensities over time than their atomistic counterparts. They
reduce prices (and more importantly) price-cost margins by less in
response to a demand slump and increase them by less in the boom phase .
This does not fit well with the folklore which would predict that on
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average prices would tend to fall more in recessions the more
concentrated is the industry. Our theory would explain these facts as
follows. It requires that prices fall relative to marginal cost in
booms. This is consistent with rising price cost margins as long as some
of the expenditure on labor is in fact a fixed cost. This can be seen as
follows: Suppose that price and marginal cost are constant and that
there are some fixed costs. Then if the labor costs include some fixed
costs an increase in output will lower the importance of these fixed
costs thus raising price-cost margins. The key is that price-cost
margins rise by less in concentrated industries. So either the fixed
costs are less important in the concentrated industries, which seems a
priori unlikely, or the concentrated industries tend to reduce prices
relative to marginal cost.
We also study some independent evidence on margins. Burda (1984)
reports correlations between employment and real product wages in various
two digit industries. These real product wages are given by the average
hourly wage paid by the industry divided by the value added deflator for
the industry. They can be interpreted as a different crude measure of
marginal cost over prices. Their disadvantage over the traditional
price-cost margin is that, unlike the latter, they not only require that
materials be proportional to output but also that materials costs be
simply passed on as they viould in a competitive industry with this cost
stmicture. On the other hand, their advantage over the traditional
measure is that they remain valid when some of the payroll expenditure is
a fixed cost as long as, at the margin, labor has a constant marginal
product. Moreover it turns out that if the marginal product of labor
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actually falls as employment rises our evidence provides even stronger
support for our theory.
The correlations reported by Burda for the real product wage and
employment using detrended yearly data from 1947 to 1978 are reported in
Table 3 which also reports the average four firm concentration ratio for
each two digit industry. This average is obtained by weighting each four
digit SIC code industry within a particular 2 digit SIC code industry by
its sales in 1967. These weights were then applied to the 1967 four firm
concentration indices for each 4 digit SIC code industry obtained from
the Census.
^
TABLE 5
CONCENTRATION AND THE CORRELATION BEETWEEN REAL
WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT
SIC# INDUSTRY DESIGNATION CORREL. CONCEN.
DURABLES MANUFACTURING ' .
24 Lumber and wood products
25 Furniture and fixtures
52 Stone, clay and glass
55 Primary metals
54 Fabricated metal industries
55 Machinery except electrical
56 Electrical and electronic equipment
571 Motor vehicles and equipment
572-9 Other transportation equipment
58 Instruments and related products
NONDURABLE MANUFACTURING
20 Food and Kindred products
21 Tobacco manufactures
22 Textile mill products
25 Apparel and related products
26 Paper and allied products
27 Printing and publishing
28 Chemical and allied products
29 Petroleum and coal products
50 Rubber
51 Leather and leather products
.55 17.6
.18 21.6
.59 57.4
.32
.
• 42.9
.23 29.1
.12 56.5
.54 45.0
.19 80.8
.02 50.1
.36 47.8
.30 54.5
.64 75.6
,04 54.1
53 19.7
.42 51.2
,40 18.9
.05 49.9
48. 52.9
,16 69.1
44 24.5
0^
At first glance it is clear from the table that more concentrated
industries like motor vehicles and electrical machinery tend to have
positive correlations while less concentrated industries like leather,
food and wood products tend to have negative correlations. Statistical
testing of this correlation with the concentration index is, however,
somewhat delicate. That is because our theory does not predict that an
industry which is 5^ more concentrated than another will reduce prices
more severely in a boom. On the contrary a fully fledged monopoly will
always charge the monopoly price which usually increases when demand
increases. All our theory says is that as soon as an industry becomes an
oligopoly it becomes likely that it will cut prices in booms. Naturally
the concentration index is not a perfect measure of whether an industry-
is an oligopoly. Indeed printing has a low concentration index even
though its large components are newspapers, books and magazines which are
in fact highly concentrated once location in space or type is taken into
account. Nonetheless higher concentration indices are at least
indicators of a smaller number of important sellers. Glass is undoubtely
a more oligopolistic industry than shoes. So we decided to classify the
sample into relatively unconcentrated and relatively concentrated and
chose, somewhat arbitrarily, as the dividing line the median
concentration of 35.4. This lies between food and nonelectrical
machinery. ¥e can then construct the following 2X2 contingency table:
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TABLE 4
Unconcentrated Concentrated Total
Negatively-
correlated 7 3 10
Positively
correlated 3 7 10
Total 10 10 20
An alternative table can be obtained by neglecting the three
observations whose correlations are effectively zero. These are sectors
22, 28 and 372-9. Their correlations are at most equal in absolute value
to a third of the next lowest correlation. Then the contingency table
has, instead of the values 7:3:3:7, the values 7:2:2:6.
It is now natural to test whether concentrated industries have the
same ratio of positive correlations to negative ones against the
alternative that this ratio is significantly higher. The j^ test of
independence actually only tests whether the values are unusual under the
hypothesis of independence without focusing on our particular
alternative. It rejects the hypothesis of independence with 92^
confidence using the values of Table 4 and with 97^ confidence using the
values 7:2:2:6. This test is, however, likely to be flawed for the small
sample we consider. Fisher's test would appear more appropiate since it
is an exact test against the alternative that more concentrated sectors
have more positive correlations. With this test the hypothesis that the
ratio of positive correlations is the same can be rejected with 91^
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confidence using the data of Tatle 4 and with 96« confidence using
7:2:2:6.
There is thus a fair amount of evidence for the hypothesis that more
concentrated sectors are more likely to have positive correlations. We
interpret this by imagining a world in which technology is subject to
technological progress at a constant rate and in which capital is
accumulated smoothly. The deviations of employment from its trend then
occur only in response to increased demand. Then if the firms behave
monopolistically the real product wage will tend to fall when demand
increases. The same will occur if the firms are competitive and the
marginal product of labor falls as employment rises. Particularly when
there are diminishing returns to labor the finding that the product wage
rises when employment rises suggests the widespread price cutting our
theory implies.
There are alternative explanations for our findings, however. The
first is that the positive correlations are due to monopolistic pricing
in the face of increasing returns to labor in the short run. The
existence of such increasing retuns strike us as unlikely. When
production is curtailed this is usually done by temporary closings of
plants or reductions of hours worked. These reductions would always
start with the most inefficient plants and workers thus suggesting at
most constant returns to labor in the short run. The second alternative
explanation relies on technological shocks. These shocks can, in
principle either increase or decrease the demand for labor by a
particular sector. If they increase the demand and the sector faces an
upwards sloping labor supply function, employment and real wages can both
increase. The difficulty with this alternative explanation is that the
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sectors with positive correlations do not appear to be those which a
casual observer would characterize as having many technological shocks of
this type. In particular stone, clay and glass, printing and publishing
and rubber appear to be sectors with fairly stagnant technologies. On the
other hand instruments and chemicals may well be among those whose
technology has been changing the fastest.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper basically consists of three parts. The first is a somewhat
novel theory of oligopolies in situations in which demand fluctuates.
The second is an analysis of the business cycles that such oligopolies
can induce, while the third is a study of the plausibility of the idea
that oligopolistic industries tend to behave more competitively in booms.
Since the data appear consistent with this idea they consitute fairly
direct evidence in favor of both our theory of oligopoly and that of
business cycles. This suggests that both theories and their empirical
validation deserve to be extended.
The theory of oligopoly might be extended to include also
imperfectly observable demand shifts, prices and outputs. This type of
imperfect observability is the main concern of Green and Porter (1984)
who study markets with no observable shifts in demand. The advantage of
introducing unobservable shifts in demand is that these can induce
reversions to punishing behavior even when all firms are acting
collusively. A natural question to ask is whether reversions to
punishing behavior that result from unobservable shocks are more likely
when everybody expects the demand curve to have shifted out.
Unfortunately this appears to be a very difficult question to answer.
Even the features of the optimal supergame without observable shocks
discussed in Porter (iS^Ja) are hard to characterize. Adding the
complication that both the length of the punishment period as well as the
price that triggers a reversion depend on observable demand is a
57
formidable task.
In this paper we considered only business cycles which are due
to the tendencjr of oligopolists to act more competitively when
demand shifts towards their products. An alternative and commonly held
view is that business cycles are due to changes in aggregate demand which
do not get reflected in nominal wages. In that case a decrease in
aggregate demand raises real wages thereby reducing all outputs. In our
theory of oligopoly, firms tend to collude more in these periods. Hence
recessions are not only bad because output is low but also because
microeconomic distortions are greater. This suggests that stabilization
of output at a high level is desirable because it reduces these
distortions.
On the other hand, the business cycles discussed here do not
necessarily warrant stabilization policy. Vfhile models of real
business cycles merely feature ineffective stabilization policies
here such policies might actually be harmfull. Booms occur because,
occasionally, demand shifts towards oligopolistic products. In these
periods the incentive to deviate from the collusive outcome is greatest
because the punishment will be felt in periods which, on average have
lower demand and hence lower profits. If instead future demand were also
known to be high, the threat of losing the monopoly profits in those good
periods might well be enough to induce the members of the oligopoly to
collude now. So, if demand for the goods produced by oligopolies were
stable they might collude always, leaving the economy in a permanent
recession.^'' Therefore the merits of stabilization policy hinge
crucially on whether business cycles are due to shifts in demand
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unaccompanied by nominal rigidities or whether tney are due to changes in
aggregate demand accompanied by such rigidities. Disentangling the
nature of the shifts in the demand faced by oligolopies therefore seems
to be a promising line of research.
Much work also remains to be done empirically validating our
model itself. In section IV we presented a variety of simple tests
capable of discriminating between the Industrial Organization folklore
and our theory. Since none of them fsvored the folklore it may well be
without empirical content. On the other hand, our theory deserves to be
tested more severely. First a more diaagregated study of the cyclical
properties of price-cost margins seems warranted. Unfortunately, data on
valued added deflators does not appear to exist at a more disagregated
level so a different methodology will have to be employed. Second our
theory has strong implications for the behaviour of structural models of
specific industries. The study of such models ought to shed light on the
extent to which observable shifts in demand affect the degree of
collusion. • ..;<'• --..,',; .-... ...•.H
59
FOOTNOTES
^If firms find borrowinc difficult, recessions might be the ideal
occasions for large established firms to elbow out their smaller
competitors.
^See, for example, Friedman (1971 ), Green and Porter (l9S4) and Eadner
(1980).
^Sequentially rational strategies are analysed in games of incomplete
information by Kreps and Wilson (l982). For the game of complete
information that we analyse we use Selten's concept of subgame perfection
(1965).
'*In an informal discussion, FCurz (l979) recognizes the link between
short-run profitability and the sustainability of collusive outcomes.
However, the relationship between profits, demand, and costs is not make
explicit.
^The argument of K, c*, in (3) should not be confused with that in (l).
The latter represents the realization of the shock at t whereas the
former is the state beyond which monopoly becomes unsustainable.
^In this case an increase in e^ can directly be interpreted as either a
shift outwards in demand or a reduction in c, that part of marginal cost
which is independent of q. This results from the fact that the profit
functions depend on e^ only through (a+e-(--c).
'^The relevant root is the one with the highest profits for the
oligopoly.
^The intersectoral pattern of output movements can be independent of the
sector which has a technological shock if (as seems unlikely) goods are
consumed in fixed proportions which depend on the level of utility only.
Otherwise "normal" substitution effects will make the expansion biggest
in the sector which has the most favorable technological shock.
%hen constructing these aggregate concentration indices we
systematically neglected the 4 digit SIC code industries which ended
in 99. These contain miscellaneous or "not classified elsewhere" items
whose concentration index does not measure market power in a relatiely
homogeneous market.
l^For the examples in Figures 2 and 3 this occurs as long as (^0.8 when
prize is the strategic variable or 6>0.25 when quantities are the
strategic variable.
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